Conventional wisdom among environmental economists is that the relative slopes of the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost functions determine whether a price-based or quantity-based environmental regulation leads to higher expected social welfare. We revisit the choice between price-based vs. quantity-based environmental regulation under Knightian uncertainty; that is, when uncertainty cannot be modeled with known probability distributions. Under these circumstances, the policy objective cannot be to maximize the expected net benefits of emissions control. Instead, we evaluate an emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard in terms of maximizing the range of uncertainty under which the welfare loss from error in the estimates of the marginal benefits and costs of emissions control can be limited. The main result of our work is that the same criterion involving the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions determines whether price-based or quantity-based control is more robust to unstructured uncertainty. Hence, not only does the relative slopes criterion lead to the policy that maximizes the expected net benefits of control under structured uncertainty, it also leads to the policy that maximizes robustness to unstructured uncertainty. Abstract: Conventional wisdom among environmental economists is that the relative slopes of the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost functions determine whether a price-based or quantity-based environmental regulation leads to higher expected social welfare. We revisit the choice between price-based vs. quantity-based environmental regulation under Knightian uncertainty; that is, when uncertainty cannot be modeled with known probability distributions. Under these circumstances, the policy objective cannot be to maximize the expected net benefits of emissions control. Instead, we evaluate an emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard in terms of maximizing the range of uncertainty under which the welfare loss from error in the estimates of the marginal benefits and costs of emissions control can be limited. The main result of our work is that the same criterion involving the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions determines whether price-based or quantity-based control is more robust to unstructured uncertainty. Hence, not only does the relative slopes criterion lead to the policy that maximizes the expected net benefits of control under structured uncertainty, it also leads to the policy that maximizes robustness to unstructured uncertainty.
Introduction
Environmental regulations are chosen in a world in which authorities have only imperfect information about the underlying benefits and costs of environmental control. In his seminal paper, Weitzman (1974) provides guidance for the optimal choice between price-based and quantity-based emissions control (i.e., an emissions tax vs. a competitive market for transferable emissions quotas) that has become conventional wisdom among environmental policy scholars and practitioners. Weitzman shows that when the marginal benefits and marginal costs of emissions control are linear (at least to a local approximation), when authorities are uncertain about the intercepts of these functions (but not their slopes), and when the benefits and costs of emissions control are uncorrelated, then a price-based regulation is more efficient than a quantity-based regulation if slope of the marginal cost function is greater than the absolute value of the slope of the marginal benefit function, and a quantity-based regulation dominates if the inequality is reversed.
1 This decision criterion is determined from a comparison of expected social welfare (expected benefit minus cost) under the two types of regulations.
1 Weitzman (1974) demonstrates that this decision criterion must be modified when benefits and costs are correlated. See Stavins (1996) for a further exposition of this case. Weitzman, Laffont (1977) , and Malcomson (1978) examine modifications to the relative-slopes criterion when these are also uncertain. Linearity to a local approximation of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions is also important for the determination of the prices vs. quantities criterion. Malcomson (1978) and Weitzman (1978) reexamine Weitzman's original work when local linear approximations to the benefit and cost function are not appropriate. In our paper, we stick to linear marginal benefit and cost functions with uncorrelated uncertainty in their intercepts, because it is this problem that drives the conventional wisdom of environmental economists about the choice between emissions taxes and aggregate abatement standards (Baumol and Oates, 1988) . In fact, many recent contributions to this literature (e.g., Hoel and Karp, 2002; Moledina et al., 2003; Montero, 2002; Quirion, 2004) assume linear marginal benefit and cost Weitzman, as well as the small army of scholars who have contributed to the prices vs.
quantities debate since 1974, assumed that uncertainty about the marginal benefit and cost functions could be completely characterized by known probability distribution functions over the errors in estimates the marginal benefit and cost functions. 2 Indeed, the criterion for choosing between price-based and quantity-based regulations is determined from a comparison of expected social welfare under the two regulatory instruments. While it has proven useful to assume that the error structures of estimates of the marginal benefit and cost functions are known, in many cases if not most, environmental authorities must design control policies even when they are not confident of the error structures. That is, the world of environmental decisionmaking may be usefully characterized by Knightian uncertainty in which, not only are the benefit and cost functions unknown, but the distributions of the estimates of these functions are also unknown.
3
In this paper, we revisit the price vs. quantity debate from the perspective of robust satisficing when the errors in the estimates of the benefits and costs of emissions control are completely unstructured. Info-gap decision theory (Ben-Haim, 2006 ) provides a useful way to think about the regulatory choice of emissions control instruments in the face of true Knightian functions with only intercept uncertainty. We note that the approach we take in this paper, that of robust satisficing, can be applied to all of the complicating factors mentioned in this footnote. 2 Recent contributions to the prices vs. quantities debate in the area of environmental management include extensions to dynamic environments (Hoel and Karp, 2002; Moledina et al., 2003) , imperfectly enforced environmental regulations (Montero, 2002) , and to economies with pre-existing distortions from labor or capital taxes (Quirion, 2004) . 3 Knight was concerned "with situations which are far too unique, generally speaking, for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. The conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable." This is what Knight called "true uncertainty" (Knight, 1921, pp.231-232) , and it dominates many economic policy decisions because local or firm-specific details and future contingencies are poorly understood by policymakers.
uncertainty. 4 The heart of info-gap analysis is the pursuit of decisions that maximize the range of uncertainty about model parameters or functions within which the decisionmaker is certain to achieve a specified performance criterion. One decision is more robust than another if the range of uncertainty under which the performance criterion is met is larger. 5 In our case, uncertainty is about the true values of the intercepts of the marginal benefits and costs of emissions control and the performance criterion is to hold the loss associated with error in the estimates of these values to be no greater than some value. For a given loss associated with estimation error, one emissions control policy is more robust than another if the range of error in the estimates of the benefit and cost functions under which the performance criterion is met is larger.
We apply info-gap analysis to the choice between price-based and quantity-based environmental regulation in the conventional model of environmental control under uncertainty.
The main result of this paper is that the same criterion involving the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions that Weitzman derived in the case of structured uncertainty about the estimates of the benefit and cost functions also reveals whether price-based or quantitybased regulation is more robust to this uncertainty when it is completely unstructured. Although we come to the same decision criterion, our motivation for deriving this criterion is very 4 Info-gap decision theory has been applied to a wide variety of problems, including financial risk assessment (Ben-Haim, 2005) , search behavior in animal foraging models (Carmel and BenHaim, 2005) , policy decisions in marine reserve design (Halpern et al., 2006) , natural resource conservation decisions (Moilanen et al., 2006) , inspection decisions by port authorities to detect terrorist weapons (Moffitt et al., 2005a) and invasive species (Moffitt et al., 2005b) , technological fault diagnosis (Pierce et al., 2006) and engineering model-testing (Vinot et al., 2005) . 5 Info-gap robust-satisficing is a quantitative combination of Knightian uncertainty with Simon's concept of bounded rationality. The robust-satisficing policy-maker seeks a decision which satisfices the performance and is robust to uncertainty. Simon (1983) stresses the importance of satisficing-doing good enough; meeting critical requirements-when decisions must be made with deficient or erroneous information (i.e. Knightian uncertainty) and limited computational resources.
different. While the decision criterion for choosing between price-based and quantity-based emissions control maximizes the expected net social benefits of emissions control, we show that this decision criterion also leads to the choice of policy that is most robust to estimation error when authorities do not have reliable information about the probability structure of this error.
Hence, we provide a further justification for the use of the relative-slopes criterion that is conventional wisdom among environmental economists-not only does this criterion lead to the policy that maximizes the expected net benefits of control under structured uncertainty, it also leads to the policy that maximizes robustness to unstructured uncertainty.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we lay out the structure of the info-gap approach to choosing between a price-based and a quantity-based environmental regulation under true uncertainty. In the third section we calculate the robustness to uncertainty of each policy type. In the fourth section we derive the condition under which the price approach is more robust to uncertainty than the quantity approach, and vice versa, and discuss the policy significance of our findings. We conclude in the fifth section.
Info-Gap Robust-Satisficing

Info-gap uncertainty about the benefits and costs of pollution control
Let q denote aggregate reduction (abatement) in the emissions of some pollutant. The aggregate benefits and costs of abatement take on the familiar quadratic forms. The benefit and costs functions are, respectively:
where are all positive constants, restricted to guarantee that optimal abatement levels are strictly positive throughout.
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The social welfare function is simply the difference between the benefits and costs of abatement:
We assume that the quadratic forms for the benefit and cost functions and the numerical values and c are the intercepts of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions, respectively. Thus, this set-up is consistent with most of the literature on the prices versus quantities debate, in which it is typical to assume that the marginal benefit and cost functions are known except for uncertainty about their intercepts.
Assume that the environmental authority possesses estimates of the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions, denoted b and , but the factors that modify these parameters are complex and poorly understood, so we face true Knightian uncertainty: no reliable probabilistic model is available for the size of the estimation errors. That is, we must deal with the uncertainty in the estimates of these parameters without knowledge of the probability distribution functions that underlie them. Instead, we describe the uncertainty in the estimates of b and c with a fractional-error info-gap model for uncertainty in and , which is the following unbounded family of nested sets of the marginal functions:
6 Strictly speaking the abatement cost function is the minimum abatement cost function. Implicitly, we assume that abatement responsibilities are allocated among the pollution sources to minimize the aggregate costs of achieving each level of aggregate abatement. This can be achieved with an emissions tax or with a competitive tradable emissions permit policy. 
Robustness
Generally, info-gap robustness is the greatest level of uncertainty with which a decision maker is certain to meet a pre-determined performance criterion. In our case, we look for the robustnesses of an emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard, and our performance criterion is to and c is denoted . The policy maker would like low welfare loss, and therefore specifies to be the largest acceptable loss. An important result of our analysis will be to evaluate the reliability of attaining any specified level of loss.
It is worth noting that t and are the same price and quantity policies that are derived in conventional analyses of prices vs. quantities. Under the conventional approach to this problem, the expected values of the errors in the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions are assumed to be zero. Maximizing expected welfare then leads to and .
The robustness-against-uncertainty of policy p is the greatest horizon of uncertainty in the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions (i.e., α ) up to which all realizations of these functions result in loss no greater than . Formally:
For policy p , we will demonstrate that ˆ ( 
Info-Gap Analysis of Price-Based vs. Quantity-Based Environmental Regulation
In this section we derive the robustness functions for an emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard, both of which are determined with the best-available estimates of the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions and the info-gap models for uncertainty in those estimates.
Robustness of an aggregate abatement standard
If the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions were known, the environmental authority would choose an aggregate abatement standard to maximize the welfare function 
Since are all positive constants and is non-negative, , , , and 
Robustness of an emissions tax
We now turn to calculating the robustness of an emissions tax. We demonstrate that it has the same basic characteristics of robustness to an abatement standard. 
Robustness of is then the solution to a 
The Relative Robustness of Price-Based and Quantity-Based Emissions Control
We are now able to compare the robustness of the emissions tax, , to the robustness of the aggregate abatement standard, . Using the robustness functions [7] and [8], calculate
Clearly, the relative robustness of and to any critical loss, L t q c , depends solely on the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions, and . C B ′′ ′′ Specifically, is more robust to estimation error than if and only if the marginal cost function is more steeply sloped than the marginal benefit function; that is, The main result of this work is that the same relative-slopes criterion that Weitzman (1974) derived to choose between price-based and quantity-based regulation applies in our case as well. However, we have demonstrated a complementary purpose for this criterion. In the conventional case, the relative-slopes criterion provides guidance about the choice between an emissions tax and an aggregate abatement standard when the policy objective is to maximize expected welfare from emissions control when the errors in the estimates of the intercepts of the marginal benefit and cost functions are characterized by known probability distribution functions. We have shown that the relative-slopes criterion also determines which policy is more robust to unstructured Knightian estimation error. Therefore, our work complements the conventional approach to the prices versus quantities debate, because it provides a further justification for the relative slopes criterion. Not only will this criterion lead to the policy that maximizes the expected net benefits of control under structured uncertainty, it also leads to the policy that maximizes robustness to unstructured uncertainty.
To illustrate the results of our work, suppose that the marginal benefit and cost parameters take on the following values: In this case and 100, 40, 1, and
Because C B , is always more robust that q (Figure 1 
Conclusion
We claim two contributions of this work. First, we have illustrated a policy evaluation tool, infogap robust-satisficing, which is an alternative to expected welfare maximization. Info-gap robust-satisficing is useful when errors in model parameters are unstructured in the sense that they cannot be modeled with known or confidently estimated probability distribution functions.
In these cases, one cannot evaluate policies in terms of their affect on expected benefits and costs. Info-gap robust satisficing requires no knowledge of underlying probability models, and evaluates policies on the basis of robustness to loss when uncertainty is unstructured. Our second contribution is that we have reinterpreted the conventional wisdom of environmental economists that the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and marginal costs of pollution control determine whether price-based or quantity-based policies should be pursued. It is conventional wisdom that the relative-slopes criterion leads to the policy type that maximizes the expected net social benefits of environmental control under structured uncertainty about social benefits and costs.
We have shown that this criterion also leads to the policy choice that is more robust to unstructured uncertainty about social benefits and costs.
We applied the info-gap robust satisficing approach to the canonical model of environmental control under uncertainty that drives the conventional wisdom about prices versus quantities. It is well-known, however, that the relative-slopes criterion must be modified when there is also uncertainty in the slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions, when the uncertainty in benefits and costs are correlated, when the marginal benefit and cost functions are nonlinear, as well as when many of the other simplifying assumptions that underlie the conventional model are relaxed. (See footnotes 1 and 2). The approach we take in this paper can easily be applied to all of these more complicated situations. We believe that doing so would be a fruitful area for future research, and will lead to a deeper understanding of the design of environmental policies under uncertainty, and possibly to different policy recommendations. 
